Evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament

Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has many years of experience in verifying compliance of States' commitments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and similar treaties. Over the past few years, this experience has been used to implement, under the existing 'voluntary offer' safeguards agreement with the United States of America, a verification regime for nuclear material no longer required and irreversibly released from the nuclear weapons programme in the United States ('excess material'). Such safeguards measures are currently applied to twelve metric tons of 'excess material' in storage and, additionally, to the downblending of fifty metric tons of highly-enriched uranium. For non-nuclear-weapon States, IAEA verification activities under a comprehensive safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT are mandatory (Article III). It is one of the Agency's core activities 'to establish and administer safeguards ... and to apply safeguards ... to any ... State's activities in the field of atomic energy' (IAEA Statute, Article Ill-5). The NPT, however, also stipulates 'negotiations ... on effective measures ... to nuclear disarmament ... under strict and effective international control' (NPT, Article VI). These two issues are different in intention and scope, and while the Agency has clear mandate regarding NPT safeguards (Article III), it has no mandate under Article VI. Against this background, the Trilateral Initiative was launched in 1996, between the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and the IAEA, to develop a new verification system for weapon-origin material in both States. Agency verification of this material is intended to promote international confidence that it remains irreversibly removed from nuclear weapon programmes. In August 2000, the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement was signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. Article VII of this agreement foresees a verification role for the IAEA. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), banning future production of fissile material for weapons, will form an important additional component to prevent the increase of nuclear weapon-usable material. Commitment to the above arrangements, once in place, will show a commitment to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear material and facilities to produce and process this material are the essential prerequisites for nuclear weapons. The Agency has a long experience with the controlling of the production, the processing, import and export of nuclear material as the principal focus of IAEA safeguards. Nuclear material and facilities are also the core requirements for the above disarmament arrangements. The Agency's technical capabilities and experience in understanding the relevant processes will permit the effective application of monitoring and verification regimes to assure States that specified facilities cannot be misused for activities proscribed under an international treaty. The expansion of the IAEA safeguards regime to compliance monitoring for an FMCT may not be so far away. (author)