Introduction of Counter-Proliferation Capabilities in Development States

In recent history we have seen a number of States develop their indigenous industrial skills to a point suitable for the manufacture of nuclear components. Private individuals unbeknown to the State have then utilized this capability to supply directly into proliferation networks - potentially reducing international confidence in such a State. To combat this possibility, a developing State must recognize the challenges that are raised by its emerging skills and take action to introduce measures that not only help the State identify proliferation activities but also ensure the national security of the State. One of those measures might be to develop a capability within the State to recognize and counter the activities of would-be-proliferators. In many States this capability is managed and applied through a dedicated counter-proliferation unit that has strong links with border controls and customs organizations. A counter-proliferation unit, once established could show dramatic returns for a modest investment. The activities of such a Unit could save the State political embarrassment by hindering and narrowing the chances of unintentional proliferation activities. The Unit should not be introduced as part of a Safeguards agreement or as part of a non proliferation treaty. It should rather be established as an act by the State to protect and control its emerging technologies from being involved, willingly or unwittingly, in proliferation activities. This is a sovereign act of the State - solely for its benefit and should not be imposed by any external power. Today's would-be-proliferators around the world cooperate and act together; similarly emerging counter-proliferation units should act and work together in order to be a step ahead of the proliferators. Improved world-wide cooperation should increase the detection rate of proliferation incidents which will in turn curtail the spread of nuclear weapons - for the benefit of all. (author)