Design and operational provisions for nuclear security in India

Full text: Design and operational provisions for the Security for nuclear material and facilities in India have been significantly upgraded since 2002. IAEA publications on the subject and training of personnel at courses conducted by IAEA have been of good help in this effort . A manual on security for Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) was prepared by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) covering aspects such as physical protection system, training. certification of personnel, documentation and reporting. Since implementation of all the provisions of the manual would require considerable time, 'Minimum Requirements of Physical Protection System (PPS)' was specified for all NPPs. These requirements include; credentials of personnel, exclusion boundary, main plant boundary, operating island, delay elements, physical barrier, central alarm station, etc. using a graded approach. Site constraints in implementing these requirements were mainly on account of problem in retrofitting in plants constructed in early 70s and 80s. To get over this problem, alternate means of meeting the requirements were worked out. The minimum requirements for PPS are now being upgraded to include aspects like back-up power supplies, security operating procedures and conduct of exercises. Audit of PPS for all NPPs and front-end and back-end fuel cycle facilities was carried out. Based on the observations, a dedicated group is being constituted at each site for maintaining and reviewing security aspects and for conduct of security awareness program to enhance security culture. Other improvements include ensuring fail safe design of PPS elements, development of a standard concept of PPS that may be suitably modified for individual sites and training of operating personnel and security personnel including the response force. Work on development of Design Basis Threat (DBT) has been initiated with emphasis on scenarios that can lead to unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use, storage or transport. The guiding principles are: defining unacceptable consequences and direct or indirect identification of areas to be protected. The indirect method identifies vulnerable areas such as those where components of engineered safety features are located. The AERB guide on Consenting Process for NPPs and Research Reactors lays down the requirements of safety and security for different stages of a project and all the projects under construction will have to comply with these requirements. This also includes fulfilling the security requirements for new fuel storage area before arrival of fuel at the site. For projects being constructed near an operating plant, access control procedures for construction contractor personnel, vehicles and material have been specified. For multi-unit projects, once the first unit comes to the fuel loading stage, the PPS requirements for plant have to be fulfilled and that unit is segregated from the unit under construction from security considerations. AERB has also prepared draft guidelines on security event reporting and for conduct of regulatory inspection of security aspects. AERB guide on 'Security of radioactive material during transport' has been issued and the draft guide on 'Security of radioactive sources in radiation facilities' has been prepared and is under review. This paper will discuss improvements brought about in security systems for nuclear facilities in India based on the changing security scenarios and threat perceptions as also the experience gained in this field both at the national and international levels. (author)