A Study of Candidate Non-Destructive Assay Methods for Unattended UF6 Cylinder Verification: Measurement Campaign Results
Creators
- 1. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- 2. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- 3. US Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States)
- 4. Directorate General for Energy, European Commission (Luxembourg)
- 5. URENCO, Almelo (Netherlands)
Description
Verification of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders is one of the key components of enrichment plant safeguards, and in recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has explored the possibility of developing an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) to provide 100% verification of cylinders within an enrichment facility while reducing the need for routine measurements and sampling during on-site inspections. In 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) signed an Action Sheet for the exchange of recent findings and a joint measurement campaign to advance the capabilities of both parties in the area of non-destructive assay (NDA) methods for UF6 cylinder verification. The measurement campaign occurred in May 2013 at URENCO's gas centrifuge enrichment plant in the Netherlands and included participants from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, the EC's Nuclear Safeguards Directorate, and an observer from the IAEA. Over five days at the site, the participants measured a total of 45 cylinders. Included in the population were typical 30B and 48Y cylinders containing feed, product, and tails and, in order to stress test the NDA systems, a smaller subset of atypical cylinders containing reprocessed (i.e., uranium derived from reactor recycle), non-homogenized, or very old UF6. The joint measurement campaign allowed for the direct comparison of mature handheld gamma-ray detectors that are in regular use by Euratom inspectors with two emerging NDA technologies for UF6 cylinder verification, namely the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA) and the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper provides an overview of the Action Sheet, background on the two emerging NDA techniques, a summary of the measurement campaign results, and the implications for a potential UCVS. (author)
Additional details
Publishing Information
- Imprint Title
- Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People. Book of Abstracts, Presentations and Papers
- Imprint Pagination
- 491 p.
- Journal Page Range
- p. 378
- Report number
- IAEA-CN--220
Conference
- Title
- Linking Strategy, Implementation and People
- Acronym
- 12. Symposium on International Safeguards
- Dates
- 20-24 Oct 2014
- Place
- Vienna (Austria)
INIS
- Country of Publication
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Country of Input or Organization
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- INIS RN
- 46076159
- Subject category
- S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
- Resource subtype / Literary indicator
- Conference
- Descriptors DEI
- CYLINDERS; EURATOM; GAMMA DETECTION; GAS CENTRIFUGES; IAEA; ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS; LANL; NETHERLANDS; SAFEGUARDS; URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE; VERIFICATION
- Descriptors DEC
- ACTINIDE COMPOUNDS; CENTRIFUGES; CONCENTRATORS; DETECTION; DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; EUROPE; EUROPEAN UNION; FLUORIDES; FLUORINE COMPOUNDS; HALIDES; HALOGEN COMPOUNDS; INDUSTRIAL PLANTS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; RADIATION DETECTION; URANIUM COMPOUNDS; URANIUM FLUORIDES; URANIUM HALIDES; US DOE; US ORGANIZATIONS; WESTERN EUROPE
Optional Information
- Notes
- S28: Safeguards at Enrichment Facilities
- Secondary number(s)
- CN--220-298; S28--02