Executive summary of major NuMI lessons learned: a review of relevant meetings of Fermilab's DUSEL Beamline Working Group

We have gained tremendous experience with the NuMI Project on what was a new level of neutrino beams from a high power proton source. We expect to build on that experience for any new long baseline neutrino beam. In particular, we have learned about some things which have worked well and/or where the experience is fairly directly applicable to the next project (e.g., similar civil construction issues including: tunneling, service buildings, outfitting, and potential claims/legal issues). Some things might be done very differently (e.g., decay pipe, windows, target, beam dump, and precision of power supply control/monitoring). The NuMI experience does lead to identification of critical items for any future such project, and what issues it will be important to address. The DUSEL Beamline Working Group established at Fermilab has been meeting weekly to collect and discuss information from that NuMI experience. This document attempts to assemble much of that information in one place. In this Executive Summary, we group relevant discussion of some of the major issues and lessons learned under seven categories: (1) Differences Between the NuMI Project and Any Next Project; (2) The Process of Starting Up the Project; (3) Decision and Review Processes; (4) ES and H: Environment, Safety, and Health; (5) Local Community Buy-In; (6) Transition from Project Status to Operation; and (7) Some Lessons on Technical Elements. We concentrate here on internal project management issues, including technical areas that require special attention. We cannot ignore, however, two major external management problems that plagued the NuMI project. The first problem was the top-down imposition of an unrealistic combination of scope, cost, and schedule. This situation was partially corrected by a rebaselining. However, the full, desirable scope was never achievable. The second problem was a crippling shortage of resources. Critical early design work could not be done in a timely fashion, leading to schedule delays, inefficiencies, and corrective actions. The Working Group discussions emphasized that early planning and up-front appreciation of the problems ahead are very important for minimizing the cost and for the greatest success of any such project. Perhaps part of the project approval process should re-enforce this need. The cost of all this up-front work is now reflected in the DOE cost of any project we do. If we are being held to an upper limit on the project cost, the only thing available for compromise is the eventual project scope