Published May 7, 2014 | Version v1
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Challenges to nuclear export controls today

  • 1. Institute for Transuranium Elements, European Commission Joint Research Center TP 800, Via E. Fermi, 2749, I-21027, Ispra (Italy)

Description

Nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation programs are potentially inter-twinned, which is a point to be taken into account when analysing the development of civil nuclear energy, both domestically and as foreign investment. International agreements ensure that the adhering countries fulfil their obligations and do not abuse civil nuclear programs for the production of nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment is the process currently most focused on in this respect by recent news and recent technological and commercial developments. But also the so-called reactor-based pathway, with extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing remains in the spotlight of inspectors. Two of the main and complementary pillars on which the prevention of such diversion relies, are Strategic Export Control and International Safeguards. Strategic export control is a key barrier against nuclear proliferation. In many countries including the EU, it is set by a legal framework, envisaging implementation, enforcement and prosecution. The goods that can exported only with authorisations are those identified by the international export control regimes; primarily the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the case of nuclear items. It is complemented by nuclear safeguards measures, and especially in the past few years, by the IAEA State Level concept, which looks at the overall country's potential, including its industrial structure to derive conclusions on the absence of undeclared activities. However, the strict control of goods and knowledge is a moving target, since technological developments, globalisation and the intensifying exchange of information via the worldwide web offer increasing opportunities to proliferators to acquire sensitive items and competencies, and create bigger challenges to enforcement, calling for new responses. Research and development programmes must be directed towards supporting the adaptation of current proliferation containment systems to these new challenges. The proposed paper will address the nature of strategic trade controls challenges, describe a few emerging threats and stress the key role of exporters' awareness and compliance in this respect. (authors)

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Part of:
Proceedings of the European Nuclear Conference - ENC 2014

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Proceedings of the European Nuclear Conference - ENC 2014
Imprint Pagination
1238 p.
Journal Page Range
p. 868-872
Report number
INIS-XE--15-ENC-2014

Conference

Title
European Nuclear Conference
Acronym
ENC 2014
Dates
11-14 May 2014
Place
Marseille (France)

INIS

Country of Publication
European Commission (EC), Brussels (Belgium)
Country of Input or Organization
France
INIS RN
46123289
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS; CONTROL; EXPORTS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS; ISOTOPE SEPARATION; NUCLEAR ENERGY; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PLUTONIUM; PROLIFERATION; SAFEGUARDS; SPENT FUELS
Descriptors DEC
ACTINIDES; AGREEMENTS; CONTAINMENT; ELEMENTS; ENERGY; ENERGY SOURCES; ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS; FUELS; MATERIALS; METALS; NUCLEAR FUELS; REACTOR MATERIALS; SEPARATION PROCESSES; TRADE; TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS; WEAPONS

Optional Information

Notes
Document available online at: http://www.euronuclear.org/events/enc/enc2014/transactions.htm
Secondary number(s)
ENC--2014-A0039