Complementarities between nuclear security, safeguards and national system of accounting for and control

Full text: Nuclear security deals with prevention against theft and diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage against nuclear materials or installations. It is based on provisions of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities complemented by: Provisions for accounting for and control to prevent and, where appropriate, detect loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials; The nuclear safety provisions to protect nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage. Safeguards are based on the statements and accounting controls in the facilities. The respective aim of EURATOM and IAEA controls is to verify afterwards the respect for the declared use of materials or political commitments undertaken by States under the nonproliferation purpose. However, EURATOM and IAEA controls are not exercised at all facilities (including those working for defence purposes) or in respect of all nuclear materials subject to the French national control. In addition, these international safeguards do not deal with physical protection of nuclear materials which is the sole responsibility of the State. The national control, implemented in France, is positioned upstream to the international controls. It aims to prevent, deter and detect the loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials in installations or during transport. It places the responsibility of a possible diversion at the operator level. It is made of different components that complement each other and form a coherent whole. This includes: physical protection; accounting for and control; inspections. The physical protection system has to protect nuclear materials against a malicious act. Malicious act means a theft or diversion of nuclear material or an act of sabotage affecting nuclear materials or facilities which could lead to radiological releases into the environment. The accounting for and control system of nuclear materials has to allow the continuous and accurate knowledge of the quantity, quality and location of nuclear materials to immediately detect any anomalies concerning the monitoring of these materials. Under the first level of control, the operator has to ensure the monitoring, accounting and physical protection of all nuclear materials it holds in its facilities. The second level of control under the competent authority's responsibility has to check through the centralized accountability the consistency of stocks and movements of nuclear materials, and to verify that the protective measures provided for by the regulation are properly implemented. According to that, the system established by the French legislation (Code of Defence) is able to acquire and to submit to the French authorities an overview of nuclear activities based on the national territory. (author)