Progress in safeguards: 1983 implementation

In June 1984 the Director General was in the position to advise the Agency's Board of Governors that in 1983, as in previous years, the Secretariat, in carrying out the safeguards obligations of the Agency, did not detect any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant quantity of safeguarded nuclear material - or the misuse of facilities or equipment subject to safeguards under certain agreements - for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or for any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device, or for purposes unknown. With the exception of two cases where the Agency was unable to draw conclusions for part of the year, it is considered reasonable to conclude that the nuclear material under Agency safeguards in 1983 remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. The two cases are discussed in the paper. Statements like the above, with minor variations in words, have been made annually since 1977 and reported in the Agency's Annual Report which is submitted by the Board of Governors to the Agency's General Conference and subsequently to the United Nations General Assembly. Perhaps less well known, however, is the manner in which the Director General arrives at statements of this nature. This article illustrates with a few facts and figures the efforts made and the methods employed by the Secretariat to assemble and evaluate information required to support such statements