The impact of the Additional Protocol and Strengthened Safeguards: effects on the International Atomic Energy Agency and on states

The paper was prepared on the basis of interviews conducted by the author with former and current staff members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who were involved in the development of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) or who currently participate in activities related to the implementation of Additional Protocols. It is also based on publicly available information provided by representatives of member states at IAEA symposia or workshops in connection with the implementation of their Additional Protocols. Additional Protocols (APs) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) are part of the process of strengthening the safeguards system of the IAEA. This process was initiated as a response to weaknesses which were identified in this system following the discovery in 1991 that the Iraqi Government had a clandestine weapons programme. This paper will examine the changes which have occurred in the Department of Safeguards at the IAEA and to the way safeguards are implemented in states which have concluded APs to their CSAs. It will present these changes in order to show that this process has resulted in substantial improvements to the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA's safeguards implementation. This paper is divided into 3 sections. Section 1 will provide a background and history of the strengthened safeguards programme. Section 2 will argue that the AP has made safeguards implementation by the IAEA more effective by shifting the role of the IAEA's inspectors from 'accountants' to 'analysts', moving from a facility oriented approach to safeguards implementation to a state-centred approach and making safeguards decision-making an information-driven process. Section 2 will also argue that, over time, the AP has probably made safeguards more efficient because the use of integrated safeguards supports efforts to optimise the use of resources at the IAEA, however, many factors make it difficult to conclude that there really have been gains in efficiency. Section 3 reflects various experiences gained by states in implementing their APs. This section will examine the process of implementing safeguards in states with APs to their CSAs for states with significant nuclear activities and states with limited or no nuclear activities. The paper will conclude on two points on the AP's effect, in the context of strengthened safeguards. Firstly, the AP has contributed to developments which indicate improved effectiveness, and possibly efficiency in the implementation of safeguards by the IAEA, and secondly, that the AP has presented challenges to many states but has also provided substantial benefits and has contributed to the strengthening of regional and global security and trust by enabling the IAEA to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in those states