Fukushima, Crisis of a Model of Governance

The year following the March 11, 2011, Fukushima catastrophe was a period of stock taking, self-criticism, and adjustment: a model of governance was on trial in Japan. In order to avoid widespread panic, the government chose to under-inform the population. Yet the government itself was very poorly informed, and the agencies on which it depended in this domain did not possess the firsthand information or expertise they were supposed to supply. Of all the actors involved in managing the nuclear crisis, the government was no doubt the least at fault. The operator surveillance body, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the operator, TEPCO, were both aware that safety standards had been neglected at the Fukushima Daiichi reactor. The various reports produced since the catastrophe have shed light on the failings of a system of governance, and the Japanese government has quickly drawn lessons from them. The doubts that were thus raised concerning the place of the nuclear sector in energy production were nevertheless shelved following the return to power of a liberal-democrat majority in December 2012