EPR meets the next generation PWR safety requirements

At the origin was the common decision in 1989 of Framatome and Siemens to cooperate to design a Nuclear Island which meets the future needs of utilities. EDF and a group of main German Utilities joined this effort in 1991 and from that point were completely involved in the progress of the work. Compliance of the EPR with the European Utility Requirements (EUR) was verified to ensure a large acceptability of the design by other participating utilities. In addition, the entire process was backed up to the end of 1998 by the French and the German Safety Authorities which engaged into a long-lasting cooperation to define common requirements applicable to future Nuclear Power Plants. Upon signature of the Olkiluoto 3 contract, STUK, the Finnish safety and radiation authority, began reviewing the design of the EPR. Upon the favorable recommendation of STUK, the Finnish government delivered a Construction License for the Olkiluoto 3 NPP on February 17, 2005. Following the positive conclusion of the political debate in France with regard to nuclear energy, EDF will also submit a request to start the construction of an EPR on the Flamanville site. In the US, the first steps in view of a Design Certification by the NRC have been taken. These three independent decisions make the EPR the leading first generation 3+ design under construction. Important safety functions are assured by separate systems in a straightforward operating mode. Four separate, redundant trains for all safety systems are installed in four separate layout division for which a strict separation is ensured so that common mode failure, for example due to internal hazards, can be ruled out. A reduction in common mode failure potential is also obtained by design rules ensuring the systematic application of functional diversity. A four train-redundancy for the major safety systems provides flexibility in adapting the design to maintenance requirements, thus contributing to reduce the outage duration. Additional features are implemented to satisfy the following safety objectives required by the Safety Authorities: - achieve a significantly lower core melt probability by appropriate prevention means, - achieve the 'preclusion' of accidents liable to cause early containment failure, such as core melt under high pressure conditions, - achieve a major reduction in the radioactive releases, which could result from low pressure core melt accidents. The EPR is furthermore characterized by a robust containment not only with respect to hypothetical loads resulting from a core melt accident but also from external hazards resulting from extreme situations such as an aircraft crash directly on the Nuclear Island buildings. The evolutionary approach chosen by EPR designers thus corresponds to the optimal mix between largely proven solutions derived from the largest experience and innovative features needed to meet new requirements, particularly in the field of safety. (authors)