Accident analysis of Fukushima Daiichi NPP Unit-1 with SAMPSON code

The progress of the core disruption of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Unit-1 was analyzed by the severe accident analysis code SAMPSON. The code includes new modellings of the phenomena that occurred which have been deemed specific to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP: (1) steam leakage from the gasket of the safety relief valve (SRV) and from the buckling portion of the guide tubes (GTs) of some in-core monitors (source range monitors (SRMs) and intermediate range monitors (IRMs)): (2) melting of SRM/IRM GTs at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV); and (3) incorporation of continuous drainage pathways for debris relocation. During the early phase of the accident after the reactor scram, the isolation condensers (ICs) had intermittently worked until the loss of AC and DC power supplies by the tsunami. The analysis reproduced well the RPV pressure transient during the IC operation period. After the loss of AC and DC power supplies, the SRV had repeated its opening and closing to keep the RPV pressure constant at about 7.5 MPa for about 4.5 hours, resulting in a gradual decrease of water level in the core. Then the SRV stopped working due to depressurization by the direct steam release from the buckling portions of the SRM/IRM GTs and from the SRV gasket. The eutectic B₄C (control rod material) and steel reacted, resulting in the initiation of melting at about 4.5 h after the scram when the collapsed water level was getting closer to the bottom of active fuel, followed by melting of steel, zircalloy, and eutectics of UO₂+Zr. All 12 SRM/IRM GTs had sequentially melted at about 6.5 h after the scram, resulting in fall down of melts onto the pedestal floor. Since there was no intentional core cooling for about 14 hours after the termination of the ICs until the alternative water injection by a fire engine, the core disruption continued. When the alternative water injection was started at 05:46, March 12 (15 h after the scram), 85% of the core materials had already become debris. Since there were some branch lines in the piping between the fire engine and the RPV, the alternative water mass flow rate into the core was quite insufficient to prevent further progression of the core disruption. And moreover, the water injection was often interrupted. Thus, the core disruption continued even with the alternative water injection. All the core materials including UO₂ became debris at 95 h after the scram and they fell down onto the pedestal floor of the drywell. (author)