Stapp's quantum dualism: The James/Heisenberg model of consciousness

Henry Stapp attempts to resolve the Cartesian dilemma by introducing what the author would characterize as an ontological dualism between mind and matter. His model for mind comes from William James' description of conscious events and for matter from Werner Heisenberg's ontological model for quantum events (wave function collapse). His demonstration of the isomorphism between the two types of events is successful, but in the author's opinion fails to establish a monistic, scientific theory. The author traces Stapp's failure to his adamant rejection of arbitrariness, or 'randomness'. This makes it impossible for him (or for Bohr and Pauli before him) to understand the power of Darwin's explanation of biology, let along the triumphs of modern 'neo-Darwinism'. The author notes that the point at issue is a modern version of the unresolved opposition between Leucippus and Democritus on one side and Epicurus on the other. Stapp's views are contrasted with recent discussions of consciousness by two eminent biologists: Crick and Edelman. They locate the problem firmly in the context of natural selection on the surface of the earth. Their approaches provide a sound basis for further scientific work. The author briefly examines the connection between this scientific (rather than ontological) framework and the new fundamental theory based on bit-strings and the combinatorial hierarchy