Welcome address to 30th international meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, 6 October 2008, Washington, D.C., USA

The RERTR meetings, of course, have a special role among our activities. They are important not only for what is presented in the formal technical sessions, but also for what takes place in the informal gatherings, side meetings, and personal encounters. The IAEA also has participated as an observer in the International Fuel Development Working Group, a highly important effort that is overseeing the multinational cooperative research and development effort for very high density LEU fuel. Remarkable achievements of GTRI are the conversion to LEU or final shutdown prior to conversion of 62 research reactors, the return to the United States of more than 1100 kg of spent HEU fuel and more than 1800 kg of spent LEU fuel and the return to Russia of more than 600 kg of spent and fresh HEU fuel. But while much has been achieved so far, vulnerabilities remain. HEU continues to be used for military purposes in a number of States; about 150 civilian and military research reactors are still using HEU and important quantities of fresh; and spent HEU fuel continues to be stored in different countries. All this calls for continued efforts, with a sense of urgency and more coherent global action. Some of the measures that might be taken are as follows: The countries involved should join forces to step up their efforts towards minimizing and eventually eliminating the civilian and in due course the military use of HEU. Financing and other incentives should be made available where needed to assist countries with conversion operations. All countries should agree to stop producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The elements are already in place for such an agreement, in the form of the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It is high time to negotiate and conclude such a treaty. To build confidence, countries with civilian and military HEU stockpiles should declare the size of those stockpiles and publish a schedule under which the remaining HEU will be verifiably down blended. By investing in these measures, we could alleviate proliferation concerns associated with the continued uses of HEU and help reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. I believe that this is an initiative in which all countries - Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States alike - could play a role, and from which all would clearly benefit. The Agency stands ready to continue to take its share of this work through supporting and assisting its Member States in their efforts