Atmospheric transport modelling for the CTBT radionuclide network in routine operation and after the Fukushima releases

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all types of nuclear explosions. For verification of compliance with Treaty the International Monitoring System (IMS) is being built up by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBT-Organisation in Vienna. The IMS observes waveform signals (seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic) of explosions and traces of radionuclides in the atmosphere to proof the nuclear character of an event. The International Data Centre (IDC) provides analysis products for the IMS data such as various event bulletins, radionuclide reports, and atmospheric transport modeling (ATM) results confining the possible source region of detected radionuclides. The judgment on the character of a suspicious event remains with the member states. The German National Data Centre for verification of CTBT is hosted by the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) in Hannover. The BGR operates four IMS stations (IS26, IS27, PS19, and AS35) and cooperates closely with the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) who operates the radionuclide station RN33 at mount Schauinsland and supports the NDC with radionuclide expertise. In response to the Fukushima accident caused by the large magnitude 9.0 Tohuku Earthquake and Tsunami the HSYSPLIT model driven by 0.5 degree NCEP data was used at the German NDC to simulate the primary transport pathways of potentially emitted radioisotopes. The analysis focuses on arrival times and dilution ratios at the radionuclide stations of the IMS. The arrival times were predicted correctly at most stations for ten days after the accident. Traces of the Fukushima emissions were detected at all IMS radionuclide stations on the Northern Hemisphere end of March. In April also some stations on the Southern Hemisphere detected some traces which passed the ITCZ. In respect to the CTBT context the influence of the Tohoku earthquake and the Fukushima emissions on the network capability to detect a clandestine nuclear test of the DPRK in March 2011 was investigated. Furthermore detections which are possibly connected with the recent nuclear test of the DPRK on 12 February 2013 are discussed. The potential range for radioxenon emissions is assessed by atmospheric transport modeling. It is found that the gaseous fission products were contained better than 99.9% in the first weeks after the explosion.