The IAEA's analytical capabilities for safeguards

Up to 1991, analytical measurements were used primarily to verify the accountability of nuclear materials placed under IAEA safeguards. The objectives of the analytical services set up in the 1970s by the IAEA for this purpose were to improve the accuracy of the analyses, to reduce the response time of the laboratory services and to increase their cost effectiveness. The major challenge was and still is to provide the IAEA with the capability to confirm with high probability that no significant quantities of safeguarded nuclear materials have been diverted from nuclear plants with even very large inventories or throughputs. The paper describes the progress made in this respect at the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and in the network of analytical laboratories of the IAEA, with the introduction of robotized chemical procedures, X ray techniques, mass spectrometric methods and advanced spectrum evaluation software in radiometry. The aftermath of the Gulf war in 1991 demonstrated the need to complement the traditional accountability verification measurements with analytical systems that provide the capability of identifying sensitive non-nuclear materials, such as maraging steel used in centrifuge technology, and of detecting radioactive releases in effluents and in the environment, which may be indicators of clandestine nuclear activities. Relevant analytical resources existing at the IAEA or provided by Member States are described. (author). 44 refs, 6 figs, 5 tabs