Published August 2007 | Version v1
Book

Nuclear fuel cycle transparency: An approach to support the global deployment of nuclear power

  • 1. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

Description

This paper explores a new paradigm for transparency and will provide some examples of how it may be implemented in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. A system is considered transparent when the parties involved feel that the proliferation risk is at an acceptable level. For this to occur, proliferation risk should be monitored in a continuous fashion. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency can be further categorized into 4 accumulating levels: (a) bilateral or multilateral agreements on the operation, inspection, and verification of nuclear operations within a host country, (b) added surveillance and remote monitoring of nuclear operations usually at random or without notification, (c) direct monitoring of nuclear operations in real time and (d) ability to remotely secure and inhibit operations. These highest levels of transparency imply multilateral control of nuclear facilities and processes. A new paradigm should be considered for the development of deployable nuclear technology. This paradigm would have the highest levels of transparency built into all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle by design rather than 'added-on' after the facilities are designed and deployed. To implement this approach will, at a minimum, require new technology to provide secured plant process data, secure information systems to distribute the data without providing data to potential adversaries, analysis tools to digest the data provided into a uniform standard and approaches to secure material and processes safely and securely. The new paradigm will allow nuclear suppliers a means of designing systems that are demonstrably safe, proliferation resistant, and physically protected. However, the highest levels of transparency place new design requirements on the nuclear suppliers that have not been previously considered. When implemented, a complete package will be available that can be reviewed internationally, can be qualified for international deployment, and will have the confidence that every aspect of concern has been addressed by the design

Part of:
Addressing verification challenges. Proceedings of an international safeguards symposium. Contributed papers

Additional details

Publishing Information

Publisher
IAEA
Imprint Place
Vienna (Austria)
ISBN
978-92-0-104707-6
Imprint Title
Proceedings of an international safeguards symposium on addressing verification challenges. Posters
Imprint Pagination
433 p.
Series
Proceedings series
Journal Page Range
p. 383-385
ISSN
0074-1884

Conference

Title
International safeguards symposium on addressing verification challenges
Dates
16-20 Oct 2006
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
Austria
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
39093427
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
FUEL CYCLE; HAZARDS; INFORMATION SYSTEMS; INSPECTION; MONITORING; MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; NUCLEAR POWER; PROLIFERATION; SAFEGUARDS; STANDARDS; TOOLS; VERIFICATION
Descriptors DEC
AGREEMENTS; EQUIPMENT; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS; POWER

Optional Information

Notes
1 ref., 1 fig
Secondary number(s)
IAEA-CN--148/185P