Lessons Learned from Safeguards Implementation for Facilities Under Construction

Full text: The inclusion of international safeguards (IAEA/SG) early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to minimize the impact of safeguards measures implementation on facility operations. "Safeguards by design" (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of IAEA safeguards at an early stage in the design process, and to address any potential challenges as soon as possible. Ideally, new facilities will have enough time to consider safeguards along with security, safety and economic factors during the planning phase for new-builds, modifications or refurbishments. Safeguards verification by the IAEA requires access to the nuclear material and process areas, maintaining continuity of knowledge of material flow and inventory for declared activities and material accountancy verification. Consideration for essential equipment infrastructure such as power supplies, illumination, and communications can be relatively easy to accommodate upfront, but potentially costly when retrofitted. Possible joint use of equipment, such as nondestructive assay or unattended monitoring instrumentation, has been proven to enhance the implementation of safeguards efforts. A recent example is the ongoing engagement with operators and contractors in Ukraine. Early discussions fostered the development of safeguards technical solutions to support the verification of Spent Fuel (SF) transfers. These SF transfers will gather the SF Assemblies from the Rovno, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine WWER reactors into a Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) to be located at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site. The design of the transfer looked at the process as a whole, incorporated the safeguards objectives and fulfilled all technical verification requirements. In Asia, another example was identifying, during the construction of a new SF storage facility, the need to provide sufficient space to install underwater equipment. The designers adjusted the design accordingly prior to the completion of the design and licensing phases. In another example, Canada contacted the IAEA regarding a potential safeguards issue in one of their used fuel storage designs. The verification of the loading of the modular air-cooled storage (MACSTOR) cylinders has traditionally been a human-inspection-intensive operation. Adapting the design at an early stage was easy to implement and did not impact the structural integrity of the storage unit. Attention to SBD at this opportune time led to potentially large savings. In Central Europe, thanks to early discussion and planning, the design of the installation of surveillance (camera) systems supported the possibility of the "extension" of the building to accommodate the increasing amounts of SF to be stored over the facility lifespan. This will reduce the lifecycle cost of the safeguards equipment. This paper will describe in detail these examples and others in order to show how adapting simple design considerations can facilitate Safeguards implementation, assisting both the State and the IAEA. (author)