Published November 30, 1983 | Version v1
Report Restricted

Tritium related safety considerations for mirror upgrades

Description

One of the primary objectives of the MFTF-B upgrades is to demonstrate the technology of tritium breeding in a reactor-like configuration. This requires use and processing of tritium, involving an inventory of several hundred grams at the plant. This paper reviews the results of a preliminary assessment of the radiation hazard associated with the handling of tritium. The radiation dose consequences due to tritium release from normal operation and due to postulated accidents on plant personnel and the public were assessed. Maximum credible (probability < 10-3, but > 10-7/yr) accidental releases were estimated to be 10 gm in the reactor building and 100 gm in the tritium-processing building. Higher probability (> 10-3/yr) accidents or component failures would result in much smaller releases. In the reactor building, the most severe accident would result from the rupture of a plasma exhaust duct from the end cell or the tritium feed pipe to the neutral beam injector, accompanied by a fire. In the tritium processing building, the most severe accident would be the rupture of the Isotope Separation System (ISS) distillation columns and vacuum jackets accompanied by a fire

Availability note (English)

MF available from INIS under the Report Number; Available from NTIS, PC A02/MF A01 as DE84003647.

Files

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Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Pagination
7 p.
Report number
UCRL--90058

Conference

Title
10. symposium on fusion engineering.
Dates
5-9 Dec 1983.
Place
Philadelphia, PA (USA).

Optional Information

Secondary number(s)
CONF-831203--36.