Published March 2013 | Version v1
Report Open

Guidelines for reliability analysis of digital systems in PSA context. Phase 3. Status report

  • 1. Risk Pilot AB, Stockholm (Sweden)
  • 2. VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo (Finland)

Description

Digital protection and control systems appear as upgrades in older plants, and are commonplace in new nuclear power plants. To assess the risk of nuclear power plant operation and to determine the risk impact of digital systems, there is a need to quantitatively assess the reliability of the digital systems in a justifiable manner. In 2007, the OECD/NEA CSNI directed the Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) to set up a task group to coordinate an activity in this field. One of the recommendations was to develop a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), resulting in a follow-up task group called DIGREL. The taxonomy will be the basis of future modelling and quantification efforts. It will also help define a structure for data collection and to review PSA studies. This an interim report of the project. A draft guidelines document on the failure modes taxonomy has been developed. The taxonomy is rather complete covering all levels from the system level down to module and basic component level failure modes, including hardware and software aspects. There are still open issues to be resolved by the task group, especially related to I and C unit and module level taxonomy. In a parallel Nordic activity, a comparison of Nordic experiences and a literature review on main international references has been performed. The study showed a wide range of approaches and solutions to the challenges given by digital I and C, and also indicated that no state-of-the-art currently exists. An existing simplified PSA model has been complemented with fault tree models for a four-redundant distributed protection system in order to study and demonstrate the effect of design features and modelling approaches. The model has been used to test the effect of CCF modelling, fail-safe principle and voting logic. A comparison has been made between unit-level and module-level modelling. (Author)

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Additional details

Publishing Information

ISBN
978-87-7893-352-2
Imprint Pagination
61 p.
Report number
NKS--277

INIS

Country of Publication
Denmark
Country of Input or Organization
Denmark
INIS RN
44045461
Subject category
S22: GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Progress Report
Descriptors DEI
COMPUTERIZED CONTROL SYSTEMS; FAULT TREE ANALYSIS; PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION; PROGRESS REPORT; REACTOR SAFETY; RELIABILITY; SAFETY ANALYSIS
Descriptors DEC
CALCULATION METHODS; CONTROL SYSTEMS; DOCUMENT TYPES; ON-LINE CONTROL SYSTEMS; ON-LINE SYSTEMS; SAFETY; SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Optional Information

Notes
NKS-R-DIGREL; 26 refs., 7 figs., 20 tabs.