Guaranteed assurances of supply - A way to curb proliferation of enrichment technology?

The current crisis over the Iranian nuclear program has highlighted a principle dilemma of nuclear power generation and gave a decade old discussion new drive. The dilemma is inherent in the production of fuel for commercial reactors, as enrichment facilities can easily be misused to gain weapons grade material. Under the impression of the revelations in Iran and the dissemination of sensitive enrichment technology by the A.Q.Khan-Network, the IAEA appointed an expert group and conducted a conference on ways to limit th e proliferation of enrichment facilities. Up to 12 different proposals where discussed here, mainly focused on how to guarantee supply from existing resources, without leaving a recipient state vulnerable to political blackmailing. The idea s were ranging from multilateral ownership of a Russian facility, the built up o f a physical emergency fuel stock to the erection of a new plant on an extraterritorial premises under IAEA authority. The contribution discusses the technical problems, gives insight in the diplomatic struggle and tries to give perspective on future developments and what they might mean for the (non-) proliferation of enrichment technology