Protecting Nuclear Materials and Facilities Against the Full Spectrum of Plausible Threats

Reducing the risk of theft of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities to an acceptable level requires protecting them against the full spectrum of capabilities and tactics that adversaries might plausibly use to accomplish their objectives. International recommendations and requirements call for nuclear security systems to provide appropriate and effective protection against the state's evaluation of the threat. This inevitably requires a balance. On the one hand, states must ensure that all weapons-usable nuclear material and high-consequence nuclear facilities are effectively protected against real threats, but on the other, no one wants to waste money or impose undue inconvenience in protecting against unrealistic dangers. The problem is complicated by the fact that adversaries learn, adapt, and change, making the past a less reliable guide to the future. The paper proposes two complementary approaches to address this problem. First, states should examine real incidents of theft from or attacks on secured facilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to learn lessons about the types of capabilities and tactics adversaries have shown they can use. Intelligence information, information provided by other states or by international organizations, and open-source information can all be helpful in such an examination. Second, a strong case can be made that no state is so safe that it can afford not to protect against a common baseline level of threat that includes a modest group of well-armed and well-trained outsiders, capable of operating as more than one team; a well-placed insider; and both the outsiders and the insider working together. Having put such requirements in place, states should also put in place effective mechanisms for assessment and realistic testing to ensure that their security systems can defend against intelligent adversaries determined to defeat them. (author)