International nuclear materials safeguards: practical experience in the implementation of the INFCIRC/540 supplementary protocol from the plant operators' point of view

INFCIRC/540 (the 'Supplementary Protocol'), which was adopted in 1998, is to enable IAEA to obtain an overview of all nuclear-related activities of a state. This is to be achieved through reporting duties tightened up over the previous safeguards regime (Verification Agreement, INFCIRC/193) and through better access to specified plant areas. This altered IAEA strategy of verifying not only the correctness but also the completeness of information supplied by operators will enable the Agency to discover, at an early stage, clandestine, undeclared nuclear activities or plants. The nuclear industry in Germany early on discussed the Supplementary Protocol and its consequences for German nuclear facilities, and introduced its arguments into the debate in a focused approach. The German operators acknowledge the need for a functioning non-proliferation surveillance regime, are interested in its continuous improvement, and actively participate in it. Against this background, and despite all scepticism and additional burdens, the German operators have made it their job to help the Supplementary Protocol succeed, as it is very much in the interest of this industry to support IAEA in its efforts to strengthen international safeguards controls. In the long run, only credible and effective measures of control will constitute a basis on which to exchange internationally goods and services in the nuclear sector. However, industry must be able to rely on its justified interests being protected sufficiently in the execution of the safeguards measures, as is the case also in other states. (orig.)