IAEA and NPT - The verification challenge. Challenging nuclear issues point the way forward

Five years ago, member States of the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed on a number of forward-looking elements for non-proliferation and disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. This was widely hailed as a major accomplishment for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and for multilateral cooperation in this context. The NPT regime - a brainchild of the Cold War era - seemed strengthened and better adapted to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. The elements were contained in the Final Document adopted by consensus of the 187 States parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the sixth such Conference since the NPT's entry into force in 1970. Among 62 references to IAEA safeguards in the Final Document, the Agency's verification system was acknowledged as a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, one that plays an indispensable role in the Treaty's implementation and helps to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT States recognized that IAEA safeguards provide assurance of compliance and assist States In demonstrating compliance with their relevant undertakings. They recognized the IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements, and expressed its conviction that nothing should be done to undermine its authority in this regard. Member States having concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements were called upon to direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence to the Agency for its consideration. The Final Document also supported steps for strengthening the IAEA's safeguards system and for the possible application of IAEA verification in the context of future nuclear disarmament. In the past few years, some widely publicized nuclear issues have highlighted the IAEA's vital verification work in the context of the NPT. This article deals with new developments over the past five years related to these verification challenges, from the IAEA's policy perspective