Role of Safeguards in Proliferation Resistance for the Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle Systems

A large amount of plutonium as well as high 239Pu should be handled in the future fast reactor nuclear fuel cycle (FR-NFC), where very robust measures for nuclear proliferation-resistance (PR) may have to be taken to prevent nuclear proliferation. The proliferation resistant NFC impedes diversion by host states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. PR measures should be composed of intrinsic barriers of nuclear energy system and extrinsic, i.e. institutional barrier. PR on nuclear systems against the increase in nuclear diversion risk has recently been discussed in international nuclear societies such as INPRO and GIF, whereas the demand of the studies to pursue more effective and efficient Safeguards system increases and is being discussed in Safeguards communities. To find a good balance of extrinsic barrier and intrinsic one will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation. International Safeguards including Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol is the most effective institutional barrier among other institutional measures in non-proliferation regime. It should strongly function for nuclear non-proliferation, particularly, in the countries where Integrated Safeguards (IS) is implemented, because it seems unlikely that abrogation of institutional systems or diversion of nuclear materials in such countries occurs in such transparent countries under IS. The advanced Safeguards with high detectability can play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls, namely IS. In this context, a new concept of differentiation in the intrinsic measures depending upon the level of Safeguards could be applied from the viewpoint of plant design rationalization. (author)