Meeting the new challenges to the NPT

The 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the international regime aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty, with 143 non-nuclear-weapon States parties and three nuclear-weapon States parties is the most widely adhered to arms control measure in force today. Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon States (defined as parties that had not detonated a nuclear explosion prior to 1967) pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons and agree to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards, that is, IAEA inspections of all nuclear materials under their control. The raison d'etre of IAEA safeguards is to deter diversion of nuclear materials through the risk of timely detection. The Iraqi case makes it clear that the effectiveness of safeguards ultimately depends on the quality of intelligence available to IAEA. The implementation of both the non-proliferation and the disarmament provisions of the NPT have come under increasing criticism in the recent past. To strengthen the former, a variety of remedial measures are needed; these will require initiatives by IAEA, the Nuclear Supplier Group countries, the Security Council, and NPT parties in conflict-prone regions