China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler