Non-proliferation policy and safeguards

At the beginning of '90s the international community and IAEA have been confronted with serious problems related to the maintaining of the world non-proliferation policy. At the end of the cold war, rumors regarding Iraq's nuclear armament secret program and a new democracies' perception regarding nuclear safety have given a strong impetus toward reinforcing and redefining the safeguards systems. Today this system has got the most advanced and modern means for the detection of nuclear materials stealing and surreptitious production. At the same time with the implementation of the new additional model of safeguards agreements, every country developed an important contribution to end this period in which proliferation and threatening of nuclear weapons were a ruling feature on the international scene. The paper presents the principles of IAEA and national nuclear safeguards system. Mentioned are the techniques and equipment for nuclear safeguards control applied particularly at Cernavoda NPP and TRIGA reactor at IRN - Pitesti as well as those related to the evaluation of the plutonium content in the irradiated fuel. In Romania largely utilized was the program ORIGEN