Communication in the field of 'strategic deterrence': the cases of India and Pakistan. Note Nr 01/19

As nuclear deterrence is at the heart of the Indian and Pakistani defence policies, the author first recalls the specific geopolitical and geostrategic context of both communication strategies: a context which has been often defined as that of the 'second nuclear age' after the Cold War. He addresses more precisely the fundamentals of the communication on deterrence which have been set after the nuclear tests of 1998 and the Kargil conflict which actually tested the possibilities of a conventional war under a nuclear umbrella. The next part addresses communication at the time of terrorism and of the evolution of doctrines and means. The author then comments the debate set since 2013 which relates Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons to a possible modification of the Indian doctrine, a topic which is a matter of a harsh war of words. He more particularly addresses the Pakistani communication, and then the communication on two specific technological issues: on the one hand, the safety and security of nuclear resources, and, on the other hand, the technological thresholds resulting in a new dimension for deterrence (antimissile shields and MIRVs or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). He finally briefly addresses the communication on deterrence within the frame of Chinese-Indian strategic relationships which are very different from that of Indian-Pakistani relationships