There is no quantum ontology without classical ontology

The relation between quantum physics and classical physics is still under debate. In his recent book ''Rational Reconstructions of Modern Physics'', Peter Mittelstaedt explores a route from classical to quantum mechanics by reduction and elimination of (some of) the ontological hypotheses underlying classical mechanics. While, according to Mittelstaedt, classical mechanics describes a fictitious world that does not exist in reality, he claims to achieve a universal quantum ontology that can be improved by incorporating unsharp properties and equipped with Planck's constant without any need to refer to classical concepts. In this talk, we argue that quantum ontology in Mittelstaedt's sense is not enough. Quantum ontology can never be universal as long as the difference between potential and real properties is not represented adequately. Quantum properties are potential, not (yet) real, be they sharp or unsharp. Hence, preparation and measurement presuppose classical concepts, even in quantum theory. We end up with a classical-quantum sandwich ontology, which is still less extravagant than Bohmian or many-worlds ontologies are.