Investigating 3S Synergies to Support Infrastructure Development and Risk-Informed Methodologies for 3S by Design

In 2008, Japan and other G8 countries pledged to support the Safeguards, Safety, and Security (3S) Initiative to raise awareness of 3S worldwide and to assist countries in setting up nuclear energy infrastructures that are essential cornerstones of a successful nuclear energy program. The goals of the 3S initiative are to ensure that countries already using nuclear energy or those planning to use nuclear energy are supported by strong national programs in safety, security, and safeguards not only for reliability and viability of the programs, but also to prove to the international audience that the programs are purely peaceful and that nuclear material is properly handled, accounted for, and protected. In support of this initiative, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been conducting detailed analyses of the R and D programs and cultures of each of the 'S' areas to identify overlaps where synergism and efficiencies might be realized, to determine where there are gaps in the development of a mature 3S culture, and to coordinate efforts with other Japanese and international organizations. As an initial outcome of this study, incoming JAEA employees are being introduced to 3S as part of their induction training and the idea of a President's Award program is being evaluated. Furthermore, some overlaps in 3S missions might be exploited to share facility instrumentation as with Joint-Use-Equipment (JUE), in which cameras and radiation detectors, are shared by the State and IAEA. Lessons learned in these activities can be applied to developing more efficient and effective 3S infrastructures for incorporating into Safeguards by Design methodologies. They will also be useful in supporting human resources and technology development projects associated with Japan's planned nuclear security center for Asia, which was announced during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. In this presentation, a risk-informed approach regarding integration of 3S will be introduced. An initial examination of incident probability and postulated consequence analyses, which are tools familiar to the nuclear safety culture, will be applied to predict and evaluate inherent uncertainties of proliferation and security risks. A performance-based evaluation methodology will be presented for pursuing an effective and efficient implementation of 3S. (author)