The increasing risk of nuclear proliferation: Lessons learned

Over the last decade access to information on material sciences and to dual use technologies necessary to conduct a covert nuclear weapons programme have become easier to obtain, and the means to implement procurement, deception and concealment strategies have become increasingly sophisticated. The continuing development of technology, and the education and experience of scientists worldwide (who can move freely) combined with the readily available access to a wide range of information, have resulted in the increased risk that a country intent on nuclear proliferation might be successful in developing the necessary capabilities without early detection. These developments have underscored the need for ensuring effective nuclear safeguards. Effective IAEA safeguards remains the cornerstone of a nuclear non-proliferation regime aimed at stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and moving towards nuclear disarmament. Considerable progress has been achieved over the last few years in increasing the IAEA's effectiveness by introducing new safeguards strengthening measures, evaluating a wider range of information for drawing safeguards conclusions for each State as a whole, and implementing Additional Protocols in an increasing number of States. It is encouraging, after more than 15 years of zero growth budget, that in June 2003 the IAEA Board of Governors agreed to increase the budget of the Safeguards Department. reaffirming its confidence in the IAEA's ability to provide safeguards assurances. The international community has explicitly recognized that there exists no substitute to the NPT and the non-proliferation regime, since no single State or even group of them could accomplish what the IAEA is doing. However, much remains to be improved. Crises like the one experienced in lraq and the DPRK may have been inevitable, but it would be unforgivable for the international community not to draw from the lessons in order to reinforce the NPT regime and minimize the risks of similar crises occurring. An MIT Study on the 'Future of Nuclear Power' published earlier this year states that 'Nuclear power should not expand unless the risk of proliferation from operation of the nuclear fuel cycle is made acceptably small'. The measures outlined here would improve the confidence of the international community in the IAEA's capability to meet the objectives of the non-proliferation regime and would therefore be in the interest of all Member States seeking, on an increasing scale, the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy