Published 1988 | Version v1
Book

Seismic verification of nuclear test ban treaties

Creators

Description

Seismic monitoring as discussed in this paper is evaluated without specific references to the particular treaty regime to which it is to apply. There will always be some limit to the capability of any given monitoring network, and hence there will always be a threshold below which a seismic network could not monitor with high confidence. Consequently, should a total test ban be enacted there will be a very low threshold below which seismic methods cannot provide high confidence monitoring. Such a treaty could still be considered to be in the national interest if, taking both seismic and nonseismic verification methods into account, the significance of undetected violations (if they were to occur) would be outweighed by the benefits of such a treaty

Availability note (English)

US Government Printing Office, North Capitol and H St. NW, Washington, DC 20401 (USA).

Additional details

Publishing Information

Publisher
US Government Printing Office.
Imprint Place
Washington, DC (United States)
Imprint Pagination
132 p.

INIS

Country of Publication
United States
Country of Input or Organization
United States
INIS RN
23008286
Subject category
S42: ENGINEERING;
Descriptors DEI
ACOUSTIC MONITORING; NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS; SEISMIC DETECTION; SEISMIC WAVES; SEISMOLOGY
Descriptors DEC
DETECTION; EXPLOSIONS; MONITORING