Russia and the crisis of nuclear arms control. Actors, interests, perspectives

The US-Russian arms control architecture is going through a serious crisis. However, the erosion of arms control policy instruments has already begun before the end of the INF Treaty on 2 August 2019. New START, the last Russian-American treaty for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, threatens to expire on 5 February 2021 if the treaty partners do not agree on an extension by then. If New START were to expire, nothing would legally stand in the way of a new wave of nuclear armament. The Russian leadership is anxious to extend the New START Treaty. In doing so, it wants to maintain a strategic balance between the USA and Russia. Above all, it wants to secure the continued existence of Russia's second-strike capability. At the same time, arms control talks serve as an implicit recognition of Russian "great power status". The Russian self-portrayal as the preserver of existing arms control treaties is complicated by new non-strategic weapon systems. With them, Russia wants to demonstrate that it can still overcome a possible expanded US missile defence. The estrangement between Russia and Western states has accelerated since 2014 and also affects arms control. One consequence is the beginnings of arms technology cooperation between Russia and China. Germany should remain committed to the extension of New START and the resumption of strategic talks with Russia. They are a prerequisite for a follow-up agreement, which would have to broaden the concept of "strategic stability" to include both nuclear third countries and new technological possibilities.