Planning an International Category I Nuclear Material Transport

The planning and liaison required to undertake Category I nuclear material transports is extensive at both the national and international level. The UK has more than 40 years' experience of safe and secure domestic and international Category I movements. Nuclear material needs to be moved from site to the port prior to shipment by sea; consequently a number of transport modes and transhipment points may be involved, which may include the use of road, rail and sea conveyances. In the United Kingdom national legislation includes the requirement for an 'approved carrier' status issued by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). In addition, a number of other regulatory actions must be undertaken prior to and following these shipments. These actions include submission of a Transport Security Plan to the regulator for approval, a review of armed response force operation orders, specific threat assessment activities, de-confliction of transports, exercises, movement rehearsals, package/security container testing and post-transport debriefs. The overall aim is to ensure that security outcomes are met and that have been performance-based tested against appropriate objectives. It is important that an integrated regulatory approach is adopted for nuclear material transport movements to ensure any synergies can be exploited and any conflicting regulatory requirements are managed to ensure all regulatory requirements, of a safety or security nature are met. It is imperative these different disciplines do not work in isolation and there is an integrated approach at all stages of the movements. A vital aspect of any international shipment of nuclear material is the agreement between concerned States on the transfer of security responsibility. Early engagement between parties is important to achieve this. The Record of Discussions (ROD) process formalises how security responsibility will be transferred from one State to another. The ROD is captured in a formal document signed off by the Competent Authorities or other Government representatives from all participating States. Equally important is ensuring that any external release of information is synchronised by the States involved. Pre-agreements assist in this regard and the process used by the UK is known as the 'Rules of the Game'. The protection of planning information is fundamental to the success of nuclear material transports. For example, detail of dates, times and locations are all very sensitive, as they might help an adversary to plan their attack. However, carriers must be able to plan and share plans effectively. Maintaining confidentiality is difficult when information needs to be shared between different stakeholders. There is a need to ensure that transport security is a journey of continuous improvement. This includes, inter alia, physical and technical security enhancements to modes of transport and Transport Control Centres (TCC), improvements to response force tactics, weaponry and equipment and improvements to response force and ships' officers' integrated training and exercising. It is important that this 'continuous improvement' approach continues and that new technology and tactics are adopted where applicable for future transports to ensure transports remain secure and importantly that complacency does not become an issue. (author)