SSAC at Your Service: Promoting Co-operation Between IAEA and Finnish SSAC for Safeguards Implementation (Within the EU)
- 1. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Helsinki (Finland)
Description
As the nuclear world is changing, the non-proliferation and safeguard systems have to change along the global development. Nuclear security as well as safety must be involved in all phases. Thus, modernization of thinking is a must. State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is a basis, but now it is time to move ahead. Safeguards is not any more only to verify the declared nuclear materials but it is to inform the international safeguards society transparently but confidentially about the nuclear fuel cycle related activities and trade, and to confirm that there are no undeclared activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle in the states. Only strong SSAC with enhanced capabilities, activities and rights can meet the demand. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat that also urges cooperation at all levels. International, regional and state systems must work closely together, and there is need and space for everyone. State systems must step forward and take their role as they are key actors. The modern enhanced SSAC combines safeguards, security and safety in prevention, detection and response. Strong SSAC is a prerequisite for peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In Finland, according to the law, it is STUK's duty to maintain and develop SSAC. STUK is keen to fulfil all requirements for the strong SSAC. This development work has lead to the decision to build up enhanced SSAC and extending cooperation with international and regional counterparts. The national safeguards system performs a comprehensive set of safeguards and security activities. The prime objective is to be transparent; nevertheless, confidentiality and security of data transmission shall be taken care of at same time. It is possible that there will be duplication of work with other actors. This should be seen rather as a completion of the work than an obstacle. To minimize duplication, enhanced cooperation is essential and we will continue to be proactive in this matter. Finland is also active in supporting IAEA through safeguards support programme (FINSP), for example facilitating training courses for IAEA inspectors in Finnish sites. Enthusiasm and experiences with the view of IAEA demands are the driven forces. For example, safeguarding the final disposal of spent fuel is a task in which STUK has been pushing forward intensively and openly by searching for solutions and developing methods for non-destructive assay. (author)
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42081461.pdf
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Additional details
Identifiers
Publishing Information
- Imprint Title
- Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges
- Imprint Pagination
- vp.
- Journal Page Range
- 4 p.
- Report number
- IAEA-CN--184
Conference
- Title
- Preparing for Future Verification Challenges
- Acronym
- Symposium on International Safeguards
- Dates
- 1-5 Nov 2010
- Place
- Vienna (Austria)
INIS
- Country of Publication
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Country of Input or Organization
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- INIS RN
- 42081461
- Subject category
- S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
- Resource subtype / Literary indicator
- Conference
- Descriptors DEI
- ACCOUNTING; COOPERATION; DATA TRANSMISSION; DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS; FINLAND; IAEA; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; IMPLEMENTATION; NUCLEAR TRADE; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PROLIFERATION; SAFETY; SECURITY; SPENT FUELS; TRAINING
- Descriptors DEC
- COMMUNICATIONS; DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; EDUCATION; ENERGY SOURCES; EUROPE; FUELS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; MATERIALS; NUCLEAR FUELS; REACTOR MATERIALS; SAFEGUARDS; SCANDINAVIA; TRADE; WEAPONS; WESTERN EUROPE
Optional Information
- Notes
- PowerPoint presentation also available (23 p.)
- Secondary number(s)
- IAEA-CN--184/021