NATO strategy

Nuclear weapons are for NATO both the primary instrument for deterring a nuclear attack and the fall-back option if, in the event of a conventional assault, NATO's non-nuclear defence forces cannot hold. The dilemma of depending upon potentially self-destructive nuclear responses if deterrence fails and defence falters has always haunted NATO strategy, but after the Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the United States, this dilemma became more intensely perceived. Now the credibility, viability, acceptability, sensibility and morality of nuclear weapons for deterrence and defence are increasingly at issue. As a result, an increasing variety of non-nuclear (conventional) alternatives are being advanced to replace or supplement nuclear deterrence for the Alliance. The thrust of the author of this paper remarks is to attempt to apply the definitions, requirements, and other key conceptual distinctions of nuclear deterrence found in the body of western strategic literature to three categories of non-nuclear alternatives currently in vogue: strengthened conventional forces; deployment of new, high-technology non-nuclear weapons; and adoption of an offensive manoeuvre strategy. Let me, therefore, begin by listing the basic definitions, concepts and apparent requirements of deterrence which the deterrence theory literature offers