Safety, security and safeguards on a joint mission

Production of nuclear energy and use of radiation in industry, medicine and research provide for environmentally sustainable energy, means of carrying out and controlling various industrial processes, improving health care and promoting technological and scientific advances, among other things. They can only do so by being justifiable against the risks involved, resulting in radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable, being guarded against malicious or otherwise unauthorised acts and by remaining exclusively in peaceful use. This state of affairs is achieved by a system of control measures for safety, security and safeguards- the 3S. The responsibility of applying the controls is shared by the whole society: international community, national legislators, competent authorities and perhaps most importantly, the users of nuclear and radiological technology. Reliable 3S is a prerequisite for using nuclear energy. Nuclear renaissance may seem an attractive option as a means to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and so to decelerate the climate change. The global political climate, at the same time, requires that such renaissance be effectively safeguarded to prevent the technology from expanding beyond peaceful purposes. The decisions taken by society to build new nuclear power can only be taken if people have trust in the state taking care of the 3S. Credible 3S, therefore, must not only be effective and efficient but also visible. Similar reasoning applies to the use of radiation in general. Our mission as the state authority is to protect people, society, the environment and future generation s from the harmful effects of radiation. This cannot be accomplished without the 3S: safety, security and safeguards, wherein also lies the rationale for the title of the paper. Despite the joint mission, the requirements of the 3S sometimes conflict with each other. For example, safety may entail dissemination of information about radioactive sources-their type, activity, location and purpose-as extensively as possible. Security, on the other hand, may require that information be restricted on a need-to-know basis. Similarly, where safety would call for unobstructed entrance and exit, for the sake of security more complex structures to restrict and delay access could be preferable. It is clear that without coordination the regulatory control measures may be counterproductive and so it is advisable for the parties responsible for each S to coordinate their efforts in setting the requirements and in overseeing their implementation. Presently, cooperation in this area is at times unnecessarily limited due to organisational divisions and popular preconceptions: security is too secret to share information on etc. It is equally clear, however, that a great proportion of the control measures for each S contributes directly to one or both of the other S's. or, in some cases, would, if they were allowed to. A surveillance camera, for example, could benefit all control regimes, but is in practice typically limited to one. As the trust in safe, secure and safeguarded nuclear energy and use of radiation on the global scale stands or falls on the same principle s as on the state level, the proficiency of the 3S must be demonstrated also to the international community. This brings our focus on the IAEA. Within the safeguards regime, the state system enables the IAEA to evaluate and draw conclusions on the state and to implement integrated safeguards, thus providing for assurances on control over its nuclear materials and on absence of undeclared activities. While less direct, interaction on safety and security is equally important. The IAEA leads the development of a framework of internationally accepted standards and reference documentation against which states may develop and self-assess their 3S systems. On IAEA-coordinated international advisory missions the state arrangements are assessed against these references to foster continuing improvement and peer-to-peer exchange. In further development of the documentation framework, we note the value of identifying the needs of the different 3S regimes as well as their synergies. Within the theme of security in particular we encourage further effort to complete the high-level reference s: fundamentals and requirements. The IAEA also hosts several information systems that reflect the state of the 3S on a global scale (reporting on incidents and emergencies, database on illicit trafficking, safeguards data acquisition and analysis). Contribution to and operation of these systems should improve our understanding of that state. Further, as a general measure, we should engage ourselves in raising awareness on the 3S and in demystification of some aspects of it among the authorities, the industry and the general public.