Published December 1996 | Version v1
Report Open

Availability analysis of the AP600 passive core cooling system

  • 1. National Atomic Energy Research Agency, Yogyakarta (Indonesia)
  • 2. BATAN Head Office, Jakarta (Indonesia)
  • 3. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (United States)

Description

The reliability analysis of the AP600 Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) has been done. The fault tree analysis method was used for the quantitative analysis. The PXS can be grouped to several sub-systems i.e.: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Injection Subsystem, Emergency Core Decay Heat Removal Subsystem, and Containment Sump pH Control Subsystem. The quantitative analysis results indicates that the system unavailability is highly dependent on the valves configuration of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). If the ADS valves is arranged in Option-1, the system unavailability is 2.347E-03, this means that the yearly contribution to plant down time can be estimated to be about 20.56 hours per year. Whereas, by using Option-2 of fourth stage ADS valves, the system unavailability is reduced to be 9.877E-04 or 8.65 hours per year and this value is consistent with the allocated goal value (8.0 hours per year). The ADS contributes 66.89% to the system unavailability if it is arranged in Option-1, and will reduced to be about 21.21% if its fourth stages are arranged in Option-2. If the ADS is not included as a subsystem of the PXS (relocate to RCS as a subsystem of RCS), then the PXS unavailability will be reduced to about 7.784E-04 or 6.82 hours per year and this is less then the allocated goal value. The major contributors to the system unavailability are mostly dominated by Stage-4 ADS valves (air piston operated valves and squib valves), inservice testing valves of ADS (solenoid operated valves), solenoid valves of Nitrogen Supply to Accumulator, and Passive Residual Heat Removal actuation valves (air operated valves). Therefore, it is recommended that those valves be analyzed more detail to gain the improvement in its reliability. It is also recommended that the fourth stage of ADS valves should be arranged according to Option-2, i.e. one 10-inch normally open motor operated gate valve in series with one 10-inch normally closed squib valve. (author). 13 refs, 3 figs, 3 tabs

Files

28021794.pdf

Files (379.9 kB)

Name Size Download all
md5:79b3a053d591d8f7a069dd4db330e654
379.9 kB Preview Download
Part of:
Technical feasibility and reliability of passive safety systems for nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an advisory group meeting

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Technical feasibility and reliability of passive safety systems for nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an advisory group meeting
Imprint Pagination
357 p.
Journal Page Range
p. 281-295.
ISSN
1011-4289
Report number
IAEA-TECDOC--920

Conference

Title
Advisory group meeting on technical feasibility and reliability of passive safety systems for nuclear power plants.
Dates
21-24 Nov 1994.
Place
Juelich (Germany).

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
28021794
Subject category
S21: SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
AFTER-HEAT REMOVAL; COOLING; ECCS; FAULT TREE ANALYSIS; FEASIBILITY STUDIES; PWR TYPE REACTORS; REACTOR SAFETY; RELIABILITY; SAFETY ENGINEERING
Descriptors DEC
ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS; ENRICHED URANIUM REACTORS; POWER REACTORS; REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS; REACTORS; REMOVAL; SAFETY; SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS; THERMAL REACTORS; WATER COOLED REACTORS; WATER MODERATED REACTORS

Optional Information