Published May 2021 | Version v1
Journal article

Estimation of the core degradation and relocation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 based on RELAP/SCDAPSIM analysis

  • 1. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Collaborative Laboratories for Advanced Decommissioning Science (CLADS), 4002 Naritacho, Oarai, Ibaraki Pref., 311-1393 (Japan)

Description

Highlights: • The accident analysis of Fukushima Daiichi NPS Unit 2 (1F2) was conducted. • The previous BWR core degradation tests are compared with 1F2 accident progression. • Possible mechanisms of the three pressure peaks are provided and discussed. Estimation of the final debris distribution at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (1F) is inevitable for a safe and effective decommissioning. It is necessary to clarify possible failure modes of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), which is influenced by the thermal status of slumped debris that highly depends on the in-vessel accident progression. In this study, the accident analysis of 1F Unit 2 (1F2) was conducted using the RELAP/SCDAPSIM code, in order to understand better the in-vessel accident progression. One of the unsolved issues of 1F2 is the mechanism of three pressure peaks measured through late Mar. 14 to early Mar. 15, 2011. Despite various analyses, its mechanism is not clearly understood. Comparing the results of previous boiling water reactor (BWR) core degradation experiments and that of 1F2 numerical analysis, it can be estimated that most relocated metallic materials had solidified at the core bottom at the onset of first pressure peak. It is likely that the pressure increase occurred due to the evaporation of injected water reaching the heated core plate structures. Between the first and second pressure peaks, the water is assumed to have been injected continuously and the water level was likely to have recovered to BAF at the initiation of the second pressure peak. Probable slumping of a certain amount of molten materials initiated the second pressure peak and the subsequent gradual pressure increase continued possibly due to massive reaction between coolant and remaining Zircaloy in the core. Assuming the closure of the safety relief valve (SRV) at 0:00 on Mar. 15, the third pressure peak was well reproduced in the analysis. Although the total amount of the slumped material was evaluated, large deviation exists among the cases and uncertainty is still large.

Availability note (English)

Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2021.111123

Additional details

Identifiers

DOI
10.1016/j.nucengdes.2021.111123;
PII
S0029549321000753;

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Nuclear Engineering and Design
Journal Volume
376
Journal Page Range
vp.
ISSN
0029-5493
CODEN
NEDEAU

Optional Information

Copyright
Copyright (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.