Expected new role of IAEA in the area of transparency and proliferation resistance in advanced nuclear fuel cycle

International confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation has been maintained by 'nuclear material control and accountancy' and 'international safeguards' implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) framework. Several recent issues related to nuclear nonproliferation, such as North Korea's announced withdrawal from the NPT, Iran's enrichment program and safeguards failures, and proliferation of sensitive technologies in the nuclear fuel cycle, have given rise to international concern and are still under discussion. The uncertainty of the current non-proliferation situation arouses proliferation concerns and decreases the overall confidence in peaceful nuclear energy programs. Taking this situation seriously, JAEA has conducted studies on 'transparency' and 'proliferation resistance' to increase international confidence in its own peaceful energy nuclear programs, especially for an advanced nuclear fuel cycle. Several efforts to improve 'transparency', such as 'Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998)' are on-going. Also, several initiatives on 'proliferation resistance' under international programs, such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and the Generation IV nuclear energy system (GEN-IV) are in progress. Nuclear nonproliferation requirements and the expected new role of IAEA for an advanced nuclear fuel cycle were studied. The expected role of IAEA to certify and maintain 'nuclear material control and accountancy', 'transparency', and 'proliferation resistance' will improve reliability of nuclear material control and accountancy in Japan, and globally, thereby decreasing proliferation risk. High reliability will therefore increase international confidence in the peaceful nuclear programs. Low proliferation risk could drastically reduce IAEA's inspection efforts for future, large-scale advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities and allow more effective use of inspection resources to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. (author)