The Nordic electric power market. A study of the market characteristics, price factors and the competitive environment of the Nordic power market

The market price of power depends on the balance between energy supply and demand. This balance depends on several external factors: the hydrological situation, temperature, time, fuel prices and exchange rates, transmission capacity and congestion, business cycles, other weather-related factors (wind, sun etc.) There are interdependencies between the factors, but the greatest price effects are caused by changes in the hydrological situation (affects energy supply) and temperature (affects mainly demand). Transmission capacity is normally sufficient, especially between Sweden and Finland. When congestion occurs, the price effects may be drastic, due to differences between the countries in the energy production mix. Price areas with several other bordering price areas (Oslo) have the lowest price level. The Helsinki area has the highest price level over time. Congestion is more frequent between southern Sweden and Norway, which accounts for a major part of the difference between the Helsinki area price and the system price. Market concentration is very high in separate price areas, but only moderate for the Nordic market as a whole. Congestion automatically leads to a highly concentrated sub-market. Further market concentration should be avoided, and congestion management should be improved in order to ensure a functioning market. Our findings also included the fact that although power producers have increased their profits since the deregulation of the market, there were no conclusive evidence of market power abuse. A continued trend toward higher profits may change the situation in the future, as the possibility to take advantage of market power already exists. Transmission System Operators (TSO's) have a crucial role for ensuring a functioning power market. As the actions of the TSO may have adverse effects, they should be continuously monitored and subject to much tighter scrutiny than 'ordinary' energy companies. Issues have arisen from the TSO's trading of power derivatives (since the TSO may affect the area price directly) and the use of bottleneck payments (income resulting from grid congestion). The supervision of spot and derivatives trading has been sporadic, and suspected cases with abuse of market power or market manipulation have not been processed in a satisfactory manner. Competent regulatory authorities (ex. RATA) should be empowered to extend supervision to encompass all market participants and be able to impose effective sanctions. Terms and regulations should be the same for market participants based in any country within the Nordic power market. (orig.)