Future goals and challenges of the IAEA nuclear security programme

It would be difficult to overstate the urgency of intensifying our collective efforts to secure nuclear material worldwide. The graphic images of 11 September 2001 make abundantly clear the willingness of terrorists to inflict unthinkable destruction and pain. Imagine what the consequences would be if terrorists were to acquire and use dangerous nuclear material to attack any one of us. The quality and scope of nuclear material security must be enhanced if we are to prevent nuclear terrorism. It must be a high priority for all of us. It was this awareness that prompted initiation of the IAEA's nuclear security programme, the subject of my remarks. Immediately after the tragedy of 11 September 2001, several IAEA Member States approached the Director General about the need to strengthen the IAEA's ability to assist Member States in protecting their nuclear and radioactive material against the emerging threat of terrorism. The IAEA responded with alacrity. At the March 2002 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the Secretariat presented its comprehensive, cross-cutting Nuclear Security Action Plan. The plan has, since then, served as the foundation for the implementation of all IAEA nuclear security activities. To facilitate implementation of the plan, organizational changes were needed. In 2002 the Office of Physical Protection and Material Security was removed from the Department of Safeguards, renamed the Office of Nuclear Security, and relocated to the newly created Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. When this reorganization began, the Office of Physical Protection and Material Security had fewer than ten staff members. Currently, the Office of Nuclear Security has quadrupled to more than 40 staff members engaged in full time or part time capacities. Since its inception in 2002, the IAEA's nuclear security programme has provided direct assistance to over 75 countries, in the form of assessment missions, training courses or support for development of national guidelines and regulations. Several non-Member States have also used IAEA standards or guidelines when creating their own security regulations and practices. Much has been accomplished in a short period of time, and we appreciate the efforts that have been taken, but there is much more to be done. While physical protection of nuclear material and facilities and control of radioactive sources have been an integral part of the IAEA's mission for many years, they have become an indispensable part of IAEA programme objectives since 11 September 2001. In response to increased concerns expressed by Member States, the IAEA's nuclear security programme was accelerated and expanded in March 2002 to embrace a broader coverage of malicious acts such as the use of radioactive material by terrorists. Initially the programme was given a three year life span. We are at the end of that period, and the need to continue the programme is well established. It is now appropriate to examine how the programme can be improved to best serve the needs of Member States and to help ensure that weak links in the security chain are found and addressed without disrupting peaceful nuclear applications