Russian spent marine fuel as a global security risk

In this paper, we have examined the proliferation component of the overall security risk. The results indicate that several types of spent marine fuel represent an important risk of proliferation of nuclear material. Most concern is associated with spent fuel with very high initial enrichment (80-90%) with low or moderate burn up. A reactor core with initial 90% enriched fuel burned to 40000 MW(d) and initial 150 kg. U-235 still contain 100 kg U-235 80% enriched. This amount of highly fissionable material is probably sufficient for several nuclear devices. Secondly, one have to consider closely the amount and quality of plutonium in low-burn-up marine spent fuel with low initial enrichment of U-235, below 30%, and long cooling times. Calculations show that the amount of Cs-137 decides the level of self-protectiveness of the spent fuel. As a starting point, none of these types of spent fuel might be considered self-protected, however, this has to be calculated in each case. Poor engineered and institutional safeguards in the present Russian Federation make these fuel types an international security threat demanding international attention and cooperation to curb and control. (author)