Published July 24, 1979
| Version v1
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No significant fuel failures (NSFF)
Description
It has long been recognized that no emergency core cooling system (ECCS) could be absolutely guaranteed to prevent fuel failures. In 1976 the Atomic Energy Control Board decided that the objective for an ECCS should be to prevent fuel failures, but if the objective could not be met it should be shown that the consequences are acceptable for dual failures comprising any LOCA combined with an assumed impairment of containment. Out of the review of the Bruce A plant came the definition of 'no significant fuel failures': for any postulated LOCA combined with any one mode of containment impairment the resultant dose to a person at the edge of the exclusion zone is less than the reference dose limits for dual failures
Availability note (English)
MF available from INIS under the Report Number.Files
14761352.pdf
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Additional details
Publishing Information
- Imprint Pagination
- 4 p.
- Report number
- AECB--1180-4
INIS
- Country of Publication
- Canada
- Country of Input or Organization
- Canada
- INIS RN
- 14761352
- Subject category
- S61: RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY;
- Descriptors DEI
- BRUCE-1 REACTOR; CANADIAN AECB; DOUGLAS POINT ONTARIO REACTOR; ECCS; FUEL ELEMENT FAILURE; LICENSING REGULATIONS; LOSS OF COOLANT; PICKERING-1 REACTOR; SAFETY ANALYSIS
- Descriptors DEC
- ACCIDENTS; CANADIAN ORGANIZATIONS; CANDU TYPE REACTORS; HEAVY WATER COOLED REACTORS; HEAVY WATER MODERATED REACTORS; LAW; NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NATURAL URANIUM REACTORS; PHWR TYPE REACTORS; POWER REACTORS; PRESSURE TUBE REACTORS; REACTOR ACCIDENTS; REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS; REACTORS; REGULATIONS; THERMAL REACTORS
Optional Information
- Notes
- Presented to the Select Committe on Ontario Hydro Affairs.