Target Identification against Radiological Terrorism Sabotage on a Spent Fuel Pool System

Nowadays, we pay attention to a matter of safety and security relative to complex risky facilities and infrastructures (e.g., nuclear facilities, gas pipelines and tanks) as a hot issue to be tackled by a variety of stake holders such as politicians, scientists, utilities, NGOs and so forth. In particular, since the 9/11 terrorism attacks, a radiological sabotage becomes one of interesting research topics in the engineering field. According to 10 CFR 73.2, a radiological sabotage could endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Terrorism sabotage can be classified by three types as follows: 1) industrial sabotage, 2) toxicological sabotage, and 3) radiological sabotage. By them we mean any deliberate activities directed against a facility that could endanger the industry by capacity loss, the public by exposure to chemical toxic, and by exposure to radioactive sources, respectively. With regard to a nuclear power plant (NPP), the radiological sabotage requires terrorists to damage to the reactor core in a containment or/and irradiated fuel bundles in the spent fuel pool (SFP) in a fuel handling building at the site. An arrangement of these vital systems is given. SFPs have been the major concerns among scientists since they are more vulnerable to sabotage attacks than the reactor core. The reasons for more vulnerability are that 1) a SFP is housed in far less robust structures than the containment, and 2) a SFP contains much more radiation than a reactor core