Principles Governing the Sustainability of Nuclear Security Regimes
- 1. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC (United States)
- 2. U.S. Department of Energy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA (United States)
Description
In order for nuclear security regimes, including nuclear security systems, to remain effective, they must be sustained over the long-term by States and by individual sites and installations. The objective of this paper is to define sustainability and provide a methodology for States, competent authorities, and operators on the content of sustainability programmes for nuclear security regimes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC) have developed a methodology promoting the sustainability of improvements to nuclear security systems for prevention, detection and interdiction of the illicit movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These recommendations will help ensure that the capabilities established or strengthened through State-sponsored programs and/or donor State assistance remain effective and are supported and sustained over the long term by the host countries and by individual sites or installations. Physical protection and material control and accounting upgrades at facilities and radiation detection capacity building at borders and interior locations are critical elements of a national nuclear security regime. The efficacy of these prevention, detection and response measures is wholly dependent on sustaining their functionality. The sustainability of nuclear security facility upgrades and border security measures is ultimately the responsibility of the host country and each individual site or installation. This paper will provide the principles, guidance, performance measures, and best practices for establishing, assessing, and maintaining this functionality at national, regional and site levels. The methodology proposed in the paper addresses the varied infrastructures encountered among States. The premise is the establishment of a sustainability program which will ensure a nuclear security regime that is sustained and effective in the long term by committing the necessary resources. Sustainability programmes should encompass the following elements: — Operating procedures (instructions), — Human resource management and training, — Equipment updating, maintenance, repair and calibration, — Performance measures, testing, and operational monitoring, — Configuration management (the process of identifying and documenting the characteristics of a facility's physical protection and/or radiation detection system, including computer systems and software – and of ensuring that changes to these characteristics are properly developed, assessed, approved, issued, implemented, verified, recorded and incorporated into the facility documentation), — Resource allocation and operational cost analysis. Sustainability is best implemented through these six sustainability elements. A State's progression in assuming fully its sustainability responsibilities can be measured using performance assurance tools based on the functional and operational requirements imposed on people, processes, and equipment that promote and support long-term, proficient nuclear and radiation detection system operations. The national competent authority should implement a comprehensive approach to institutionalizing a multi-level review of nuclear security systems to ensure all aspects of the systems, from performance of trained individuals to sustained operability of those systems, function as designed. Key components include performance testing, data gathering and analysis, and defining metrics. Based on the sustainability principles the national competent authority can identify the requisite roles, responsibilities and tasks associated with operating and maintaining their national prevention, detection and response capacities. These will reside at the site level where the equipment is installed and operated, and at the national level, the regional and international levels. The consequences of a poorly designed or executed sustainability strategy are great. Symptoms of a failed sustainability strategy include accelerated performance degradation and higher-than-necessary project life-cycle costs. Either of these symptoms will ultimately lead to a diminished or completely disabled capacity to protect material or monitor for proliferation concern materials. (author)
Additional details
Identifiers
Publishing Information
- Publisher
- IAEA
- Imprint Place
- Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))
- Imprint Title
- International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts. Proceedings of the Interational Conference
- Imprint Pagination
- [1 CD-ROM]
- Series
- Proceedings Series
- Journal Page Range
- 8 p.
- ISSN
- 0074-1884
Conference
- Title
- Enhancing Global Efforts
- Acronym
- International Conference on Nuclear Security
- Dates
- 1-5 Jul 2013
- Place
- Vienna (Austria)
INIS
- Country of Publication
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Country of Input or Organization
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- INIS RN
- 45045551
- Subject category
- S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
- Resource subtype / Literary indicator
- Conference
- Descriptors DEI
- LIFE-CYCLE COST; OPERATING COST; PERFORMANCE; PERFORMANCE TESTING; PHYSICAL PROTECTION; RADIATION DETECTION; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SECURITY
- Descriptors DEC
- COST; DETECTION; MANAGEMENT; MATERIALS; TESTING
Optional Information
- Notes
- 2 refs.
- Secondary number(s)
- IAEA-CN--203/258