Published April 1991 | Version v1
Report Open

Optimizing the use of operating experience at Ontario Hydro's Bruce Nuclear Generating Station 'A'

  • 1. Operating Experience Reactor Safety, Bruce Nuclear Generating Station 'A', Ontario Hydro, Tiverton, Ontario (Canada)

Description

One of the most significant lessons learned from the Three Mile Island event (March 1979), and again with the Chernobyl disaster - (April 1986) was the ongoing requirement to learn from our mistakes and near misses, and those of our fellow utilities around the world: so that as an industry we do not repeat the same mistakes. The very future of our industry will depend on how well each one of us accomplishes this important ask. This paper describes in detail the challenges encountered by one station when incorporating a comprehensive 'Operating Program'. It begins with the Corporate Office's directives to its stations for such a program; and follows up with the details of the actual station implementation of the program, and day to day operating experiences. The paper describes in detail the following Operating Experience programs: - Root Cause Determination process. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) as an integral component of the Root Cause process. Finding solutions for our station for problems identified elsewhere is covered herein; - Significant Event Recommendation Tracking System: - Commitment Tracking System; - Operating Experience (Sharing Lessons Learned) System. The paper will show all the above processes tie closely together and complement each other. The paper discusses the staff required for such processes and their training requirements. It recommends process time lines, reporting mechanisms, and sign off requirements. It will describe the equipment utilized to carry out this work effectively, and with a minimum of staff. One unique feature of the Bruce 'A' system is an 'Effectiveness Follow-Up', usually three to six months after the event recommendations have been completed. By rechecking the finished actions and reviewing them with the personnel involved with the originating event we ensure that the real root causes have been identified and resolved. (author)

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Part of:
Proceedings of 2nd PHWR operating safety experience meeting

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Proceedings of 2nd PHWR operating safety experience meeting
Imprint Pagination
810 p.
Journal Page Range
[30 p.]
Report number
INIS-XA-N--171

Conference

Title
2. PHWR operating safety experience meeting
Dates
3-5 Apr 1991
Place
Embalse, Cordoba (Argentina)

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
35055696
Subject category
S21: SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
BRUCE-1 REACTOR; HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; REACTOR ACCIDENTS; REACTOR OPERATORS; REACTOR SAFETY; RISK ASSESSMENT; TRAINING
Descriptors DEC
ACCIDENTS; CANDU TYPE REACTORS; EDUCATION; ENGINEERING; HEAVY WATER COOLED REACTORS; HEAVY WATER MODERATED REACTORS; MANAGEMENT; NATURAL URANIUM REACTORS; PERSONNEL; PHWR TYPE REACTORS; POWER REACTORS; PRESSURE TUBE REACTORS; REACTORS; SAFETY; THERMAL REACTORS

Optional Information

Notes
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