Proliferation resistance and energy security advantages of a thorium-uranium dioxide once-through fuel cycle for light water reactors

This study analyzes whether spent light reactor (LWR) thorium-uranium dioxide fuel poses a significantly lower risk for nuclear weapon proliferation than spent uranium-dioxide fuel, based on the isotopic composition of the contained uranium and plutonium. Mixed Th/U fuel with an initial enrichment of 19.5% U235 can achieve an average burnup of 70,000 MWd/tHM in a PWR using 30% UO2 and 70% ThO2. To get the equivalent burnup, LEU fuel requires an initial enrichment of 8.0% U235. Two computer codes, MCNP and ORIGEN2, are used to perform the depletion calculation. The spent mixed thorium-uranium dioxide fuel discharged from a pressurized-water reactor has a plutonium isotopic composition and higher decay heat production per kilogram of plutonium more proliferation resistant than spent low enriched uranium dioxide fuel, while significantly reducing the quantity of plutonium produced. The U233 + U235 mixture in spent thorium-uranium fuel is low enriched and contaminated with gamma-emitting U232. With respect to energy security, the introduction of a thorium-uranium fuel cycle could reduce concern over uranium fuel supply of a resource-poor nation since thorium reserve is much larger, compared to fuel cycles using 4.5% LEU, while its uranium saving is almost equivalent to plutonium recycling. Overall, spent thorium-uranium fuel appears significantly more proliferation resistant in terms of the weapons-usability of the contained fissile material than spent low enriched uranium fuel, although use of 19.5% enriched uranium in fresh fuel would facilitate production of weapons-grade uranium at a higher rate in countries with clandestine enrichment facilities. (S.Y.)