An integrated safeguards system

The detection of a clandestine nuclear programme in a Member State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and at the same time budgetary concerns for a review of the IAEA safeguards system to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. The paper offers suggestions for improvements and describes the elements of a comprehensive system. New measures could be integrated into the existing system by adding to 'declared activities verification' the filed of 'supplementary measures' in the area of undeclared nuclear activities, as recently considered by the Board of Governors. The paper describes the new goals and the new methods to meet those. While improving methods and procedures in the current system which relate to 'declared activities', new methods have to be developed for the detection of 'undeclared activities' including development of long distance monitoring. At the same time, in the absence of adequate additional amounts of new funds, it will be necessary to reallocate budgetary resources. The paper views a major possibility for this in a more extensive use of State Systems for Accounting and Control (SSACs). The authors emphasize the distinction between 'sensitive' and 'less sensitive' facilities as a precondition for the sharing of responsibility between the IAEA and SSACs. The described evolution of an Integrated Safeguards System (ISS) would lead to a gradually increasing availability of resources, which would be used for the 'clandestine facility task' of the IAEA. The paper comes to the conclusion that this ISS would contribute to the improvement of the effectiveness in the IAEA verification system and at the same time to cost efficiency. (author)